Abstract: In the debate on the ontology of fictional entities realists claim that fictional characters exist. Some fictional realists are Platonists. They claim that fictional characters are abstract entities that exist necessarily and are non-spatial and timeless. It seems that the author's job is just to discover these entities. Other realists claim that fictional characters are abstract artefacts. Obviously these abstract artefacts do not have much in common with platonic entities. »Abstract« means, according to this creationistic account, that these artefacts are non-spatial entities. But as artefacts they are created and thus depend on someone who creates them and on the act of creation. Surprisingly, those realists do not say much about this process of creation. This article proposes an addition to the realist account at this point, focusing on the question of how fictional characters are created. However, my proposal is only concerned with the creation of fictional characters within the framework of fictional stories told by means of linguistic utterances. Therefore my question is: how can authors create fictional entities by telling fictional stories? I will begin by discussing whether an utterance act or a mere mental action, namely someone's imagining something, is necessary or sufficient for the successful creation of fictional entities. I will distinguish two different interpretations of the claim that a person creates entities by imaging something and I will argue that realists should reject both versions of this claim. Constructively, I will go on to emphasize similarities between fictional entities and social entities like contracts and marriages. This is important because realists in the debate about social entities provide more detailed descriptions of the creation of social entities, details which can be adapted in order to describe the process by which fictional entities are created. I emphasize that this process, namely the fictional story telling, is a social practice. The social character of this practice will be shown in mainly two aspects: Firstly, I will argue that similar to the creation of other social entities for the creation of fictional characters there has to be a collectively recognised institution, namely the institution of fictional story telling. Thus, collective intentionality plays a crucial role in the process of this creation. As such an institution plays a decisive role I will go on to claim that
the creation of an abstract artefact requires the performance not only of a mere utterance act, but of a successfully executed illocutionary act. By following Austin and Searle I will finally argue that only utterance tokens which in the specific situation are necessary to realize the illocutionary point or purpose can count as performances of illocutionary acts. In order to perform an illocutionary act successfully, the utterance must bring about an illocutionary uptake in the recipient/hearer, i. e. she must understand the utterance. Therefore, illocutionary acts can in general not be performed successfully without a hearer/recipient. Thus, to understand fictional story telling and the creation of fictional characters as a social practice means that the creative process cannot be explained exclusively in terms of imaginings. This does not mean that imagination does not play any role in producing or reading fiction. But creationists need more than imagination to explain how fictional characters are created. The aim of this paper is to take a step forward towards an explanation of the creation of fictional characters and thus to rendering the creationist's account more plausible in (1) naming necessary conditions for successfully telling a fictional story, (2) describing it as a social praxis and (3) explaining the role collective intentionality plays in this practice, we have. 
Creationistic fictional realism
Fictional realists claim that fictional characters exist. According to this view, this means that fictional entities are neither possibilia nor Meinongian non-existent objects, but exist as a special kind of entity. Some fictional realists are Platonists. They claim that fictional characters are abstract entities that exist necessarily and are non-spatial and timeless. It seems that the author's job is just to discover these entities. But not all fictional realists are Platonists in this sense. According to creationistic fictional realists, fictional characters are abstract entities as well, but here the expression »abstract« means something different than it does in the Platonist's account. Creationists use »abstract« only in the sense of »non-spatial«. Fictional characters are, according to creationists, non-spatial entities created by an author at a certain time. Therefore these entities are neither timeless nor necessary entities.
One argument for the claim that authors create fictional characters is formulated by A. Thomasson (Thomasson 1999; 2003) . According to Thomasson , a theory of fiction should respect our common-sense beliefs about fictional characters. There are examples where we have to give up common-sense beliefs as part of a theory because they do not fit others and well-confirmed scientific theories. But there can't be any results from natural sciences concerning the nature of fictional characters because, if there are fictional entities, they are not physical objects and therefore they are not objects of the natural sciences. For this reason, Thomasson argues, there are no fictional objects independent of our common practices. Thus one has to look at these practices and the common-sense beliefs to get information about the nature of fictional characters. Thomasson claims that one central common-sense belief about fictional characters is that they are created by authors. To deny that fictional characters are created would be to give up a central common-sense belief. Thus a theory of fictional characters has to contain the claim that they are entities created by authors of fictional stories.
Anti-realists in this debate doubt that there are such things as fictional characters and thus also doubt that authors can create such entities. One such objection against the creationist's account is formulated by Yagisawa (2001) in the following way: if we accept that the writing of fictional works consists (mainly) in pretending to refer to someone or something that does not exist and ascribing properties to non-existent objects, what authors do is merely utter falsehoods. Thus the question is: how can someone create something simply by uttering falsehoods? In this paper I don't want to take part in the debate as to whether there are fictional characters or not. Instead what I want to focus on are ways in which the creation of fictional characters could be explained within a creationist's framework. As the claim that fictional entities are created is such a central and important one for the creationist's account, they obviously need to explain it. But surprisingly Thomasson does not pay much attention to it: Naturally the process of creating a particular character may be diffuse: It may be created by more than one author, over a lengthy period of time, involving many participants in a storytelling tradition, and so on. But the fact that the process of creating a fictional character may be diffuse does not disrupt the general point that, whatever the process of creation for a given character may be, for coming into existence it depends on those particular creative acts. (Thomasson 1999, 7) However, even if it were to turn out that it is not possible to give an exact description that fits every single act of creating a fictional character, we should still look for aspects those acts have in common.
To this end I want to start with a look at the description of the process of the creation of fictional characters formulated by A. Thomasson. Thomasson's claims that the author of the fictional work creates the fictional character by pretending to refer to something in the context of the fictional work:
[W]hat does it take for an author to create a fictional character? This much is clearly sufficient: That she write a work of fiction involving names not referring back to extant people or characters of other stories, and apparently describing the exploits of individuals named (or, if you like, pretending to refer to and assert things about a person, as part of an understood tradition of story-telling pretence). (Thomasson 2003, 148) According to Thomasson, it is sufficient that an author pretends to refer to something within the context of a story in order to create an abstract artefact. As there may be other ways to create fictional characters she does not claim that it is necessary to perform these acts. However, it seems to follow from her sufficiency thesis that the entity to which the author pretends to refer starts to exist whether or not the relevant words are read by anyone: her criterion mentions no act of reading or hearing the utterance. According to Searle's theory of speech acts, it is a necessary condition for the successful performance of a speech act that the hearer/recipient understands the utterance.
1 At least against this background it is surprising that the author seems able to create a fictional character and thus performs a linguistic act successfully without anyone having to understand the utterances. Still, it is plausibly a widespread intuition that authors can create fictional stories without anyone else reading or hearing the story. Once it is accepted that authors create fictional entities by writing a fictional story, it seems natural to claim that it is only the author who is necessary to bring the character into existence. However, if no recipient has to read or hear the utterance by which the author performs the pretended act of reference, a further question arises: why should an act of utterance be necessary for the creation of the fictional character? Why shouldn't the author just develop her fictional story in her mind and perform merely pretended mental acts of reference and thereby be able to create fictional characters?
Of course it is somewhat odd to speak of »merely pretended mental acts of reference«. However, there are attitudes that appear to fit this description, namely imaginings. Certainly, there is an important tradition that plausibly connects fiction and imagination. So we could ask the creationist whether it is sufficient that the author imagines a character in order to bring this character into existence. If an author really needs nothing additionally to the pretended act of reference, it's hard to see why this pretended reference has to be uttered. As far as I know, there are no fictional creationists who claim that authors create fictional characters by just imagining them. But it seems at this point likely that creationists have to accept that claim as a consequence of their account.
In the following I will proceed in four steps: In the following section 2 I want to start by clarifying how to understand the thesis that an author creates a fictional character by imagining her or him. In order to do this, I want to distinguish roughly two different interpretations of the thesis. The first is that we can identify fictional characters with imaginings. I will briefly argue that creationists would be ill-advised to adopt any version of the claim. According to the second interpretation of the claim that authors create fictional characters by merely imagining, authors create fictional entities as abstract artefacts by imagining a character. In this conception the character is a further something which is not identical with a mental act or state. I will also reject this claim, arguing that neither a merely mental pretended act of reference nor a mere utterance act is sufficient for the creation of fictional entities.
Constructively, I will show that fictional story telling is in an essential way a social practice and go on to specify what that means for a description of fictional utterances and the process of the creation of fictional characters within the framework of a realistic theory. To this end I shall emphasise in section 3 similarities between fictional characters and social entities. In order to see this we need to have a brief look at another debate, namely the debate on social entities. In this debate, there are accounts that contain more detailed descriptions of the process of the creation of social entities than we can find in the debate on fictional entities and their creation. I think it is possible to make use of these characterizations to clarify what is necessary for a fictional entity to come into existence.
In order to do so I will argue in section 4 that the author can only create a fictional character by successfully performing an illocutionary act of a certain type. We will see that it is important to distinguish, first, fictional utterances from other illocutionary acts and, second, a successful act of fictional story telling from an unsuccessful one. Creationists should claim that an author can only create fictional entities by means of fictional utterances as successfully performed illocutionary acts. Against the background of Searle's speech act theory, the social character of illocutionary acts has two important dimensions: firstly, to perform an illocutionary act successfully there must be a collectively recognised or accepted institution of that particular illocutionary act type. Thus, collective intentionality plays a decisive role for the performance of illocutionary acts and a fortiori for fictional utterances as well.
Finally I shall argue in section 5 that illocutionary acts can in general not be performed successfully without a hearer/recipient. Thus, to understand fictional story telling and the creation of fictional characters as a social practice means that the creative process cannot be explained exclusively in terms of imaginings.
Creation by mere imagination?
One way of understanding the claim that authors create fictional entities by imagining them is the proposal that we identify the fictional character with the author's imaginings. Hence, »create« would mean no more than »imagine«. But in what sense might a fictional character be an imagining? Perhaps the fictional character may be thought to be identical with a mental state of the author. One could claim that an author creates a fictional character by imagining this character and this entity is identical with his mental state (the imagining).
I think it is obvious that the fictional characters Thomasson describes have not much in common with mental states. Mental states are private. Thus fictional characters as mental state tokens would be private as well. But according to the creationist's account, fictional characters seem to be public artefacts because they seem to be accessible to the readers of the relevant fictional work. If fictional characters are public entities, and I think there are good reasons to claim that, the process of their creation must bring public entities into existence.
There are even more decisive arguments: An imagining depends rigidly on someone having this mental state. When a person dies, her mental states also cease to exist. If Sherlock Holmes is only one of Arthur Conan Doyle's mental states this fictional character couldn't persist after Doyle's death. Moreover, there are further reasons why this Sherlock Holmes could cease to exist: if Arthur Conon Doyle were to have suffered from a disease like Alzheimer's and irrecoverably lost his imaginings or his memory of the imagined Sherlock Holmes, then these mental states would have vanished even before the author's own death. So the same problem as in the case of his death arises: as soon as the author has lost the corresponding imagining, the fictional character no longer exists.
According to Thomasson (Thomasson 1999, 34) , fictional characters indeed depend on the author who creates them. But that dependence, she claims, is a rigid historically relation. That means the author is required in order to bring the fictional character into existence, but, once the character has been created, it can persist without the author. In contrast, imaginings cannot persist without the person having this mental state. Thus, fictional characters and imaginings differ in at least two important aspects: Thomasson's fictional characters are public, not private entities and they have different conditions of their persistence.
Having rejected the thesis that fictional characters are mental state tokens of authors, we can turn to another possibility: perhaps fictional characters are the products of mental actions, i. e. acts of imagining. To claim that authors create abstract artefacts as a result of imagining something is prima facie closer to the creationist's thesis, as the character is here not identified with a mental state but with an abstract artefact considered as the product of a mental act. If authors create abstract artefacts with utterances that count as pretended acts of reference, we can distinguish the utterance from the artefact that is created by the performance of this utterance. If an author can create an abstract artefact only by imagining something as well, we can also distinguish the artefact from the act of imagining that creates the artefact. But is it plausible to extend the creationist's thesis in this way?
It seems consistent to do so, because it seems that for the creationist, as we saw in the quotation from Thomasson, the fictional character starts to exist as soon as the author writes down expressions by which she pretends to refer. As no additional condition is mentioned, it seems that fictional characters need no recipients to come into existence. In order to argue against this thesis I will emphasize the similarities between fictional characters and social entities and I will show that fictional characters cannot -as social entities -be created in privacy. Therefore a mere act of imagining cannot create a fictional character.
Fictional characters and social entities
According to Thomasson, fictional entities are abstract artefacts similar to entities such as contracts. She distinguishes a contract from the copy or copies of the contract. While the copy of a contract is a concrete entity and has a spatiotemporal location, the contract is abstract because, like fictional entities, it is a non-spatial entity. Contracts are also created by special linguistic actions and this is another feature they have in common with fictional entities.
But the fact that a character can be created merely through such linguistic acts should cause no peculiar difficulties for a theory of fiction. It has long been noticed that a common feature of socalled conventional or effective illocutionary acts such as appointing, resigning, adjourning and marrying is that they bring into existence the state of affairs under discussion. Thus, for example, the celebrant of a marriage pronounces a couple husband and wife, a pronouncement that itself creates the couple's new status as husband and wife.
[…] A contract, similarly, may be created simply by the utterance of words such as »I hereby promise to«. (Thomasson 1999, 12-13) As Thomasson stresses the similarities between fictional characters and contracts, this connects her theory of fictional characters to the debate on social ontology. In the following I want to give a short overview of Searle's theory of the construction of what he calls institutional facts. On this basis, we can turn to a clarification of conditions for the creation of fictional characters.
According to Searle, there are three necessary elements for the construction of institutional facts: The assignment of function, collective intentionality and constitutive rules (Searle 1995, 13) . Institutional facts are constructed by imposing functions (e. g. being a border) on a brute physical object (e. g. a trench). In many cases these functions are independent of the physical structure the object has. Searle calls these functions »status functions«.
The performance of the function requires that there be a collectively recognized status that the person or object has, and it is only in virtue of that status that the person or object can perform the function in question. (Searle 2010, 7) That an object or person has a collectively recognized status means that it counts as something, e. g. a trench counts as a border. And thus institutional facts have the underlying structure that an object (x) counts as something (y), e. g. as a border, in a context (c). From that structure we get the general form of constitutive rules is »X counts as Y in context C« (Searle 2010, 10) .
In The Construction of Social Reality, Searle defended his view that all social facts have the logical form of the constitutive rule »X counts as Y in context C«. But this view was criticized by Thomasson (2009) and Barry Smith (Smith 2003) . Both argued that there can be cases in which there is no physical object that counts as something. In these cases, we can create an object and assign status functions to it. According to Thomasson, in order to explain how new objects are created, we must allow a so called existential rule:
[E]xistential rules involve collectively accepting that, if certain conditions obtain, then there is some (new) entity x such that Sx. These constitutive rules […] are existence-introducing, since they allow that the obtaining of certain conditions counts as sufficient for the existence of a new social entity. (Thomasson 2009, 549, italics are mine) In Making the Social World, Searle integrates those cases in his theory and thus claims that we can not only create social or institutional facts by creating new properties (the status functions), we can also create new entities. Examples for such entities are corporations. In the case of a corporation, there is no pre-existing entity that counts as a corporation after a declaration is performed. According to Searle, the creation of a corporation is a two-step process: there must be a law (or something correspondingly) that makes it the case by declaration that any entity that satisfies conditions mentioned in the law can create a corporation by performing a further declaration: »So the law is a Declaration that authorizes other Declarations.« (Searle 2010, 100) Thus there are two declarations involved in the process of the corporation's creation. The first declaration is the law that contains the condition which has to be satisfied to perform the second declaration successfully. If there is such a law as a first declaration, then the second declaration can be performed successfully e. g. by a person who wants to found a corporation as long the conditions mentioned are satisfied.
According to Searle's thesis about institutional facts, it seems that collective intentionality plays a crucial role in the explanation of how things can be created by utterances or other kinds of behavior. I think one reason why collective intentionality plays such a crucial role in Searle's theory of social reality is that the creation of status functions on one hand and of new entities (like corporations) on the other hand is that both have a deontic dimension. By creating an institutional fact, we create a relation between the created status function and a certain person or persons:
We (or I) make it the case by declaration that a Y status function exists in C and in doing so we (or I) create a relation R between Y and a certain person or persons, S, such that in virtue of SRY, S has the power to perform acts (of type) A. (ibid., 102) According to Searle, it is collective recognition that enables the functioning of the deontic powers which come along with having a certain status function. Thus the existence of a certain status function and its relation to a person (or persons) must be within the scope of the collective recognition. If Searle is right, the genesis and the persistence of status functions and created entities like corporations depend on collective intentionality. The argument seems to be that status functions exist because in certain circumstances it is collectively accepted or recognized that they exist.
The question that creationists should be asking is, I wish to suggest, whether collective intentionality doesn't play a (crucial) role in creating fictional characters. Let's go back to the starting point: The creationists' claim was that a fictional character starts to exist as soon as the author has mentioned it within the context of a fictional story. According to this description, it seems that there is no need for collective intentionality because no one (except perhaps the author) has to accept or even recognise that the fictional character exists. Thus it seems that we can't use collective acceptance or collective intentionality in general to explain how fictional characters come into existence. This would mean that fictional characters do not have much in common with social entities like corporations which do require collective intentionality for their creation. It seems that (1) creation of fictional characters is not dependent on collective acceptance or recognition, and (2) that fictional characters don't have deontic dimensions. However, there is an important similarity between fictional characters and social entities. According to Searle, a corporation can only be created if a specific prior condition is satisfied, namely the existence of what he calls a standing declaration (Searle 2010, 97) . I think this is where we can find an important similarity to the creation of fictional characters. Again: according to Thomasson the fictional character starts to exist when it is mentioned within the framework of a fictional story. Now I think it is important to say more about the term »fictional story«. We still have to clarify what distinguishes a fictional utterance from another illocutionary act and a successful fictional utterance from an unsuccessful one.
Fictional utterances as illocutionary acts
In the following, I shall argue that fictional utterances are performances of illocutionary acts of a certain type, namely of the type of declarations. I will show that when a speaker utters e. g. a sentence those situations have the underlying structure of the form X counts as Y in C. In order that an utterance (X) can count as the performance of an illocutionary act of a certain kind (Y) in a context (C), what one might call the institution of that particular illocutionary act type must be collectively known. Thus collective intentionality plays a role in the successful performance of an illocutionary act. I will argue that this also holds for fictional utterances. Therefore, fictional utterances are performances of illocutionary acts and the institution of fictional story telling must be collectively recognized.
There is a debate on the question of how to describe and analyse fictional utterances (e. g. Gabriel 1975; Searle 1969 Searle , 1979a Currie 1990; Walton 1990; Reicher 2012) . It is often claimed that fictional utterances are not performances of illocutionary acts, but only of pretended illocutionary acts. According to such accounts, authors who write or tell a fictional story primarily pretend to assert. John Searle, who argues for such an account, claims that authors of fictional stories pretend to perform illocutionary acts but perform only utterance acts (Searle 1979a) . One argument for this thesis is the fact that fictional stories consist of sentences that can also be used to write a non-fictional text:
In general the illocutionary act (or acts) performed in the utterance of the sentence is a function of the meaning of the sentence.
[…] But now if the sentences in a work of fiction were used to perform some completely different speech acts from those determined by their literal meaning, they would have to have some other meaning. Anyone therefore who wishes to claim that fiction contains different illocutionary acts from nonfiction is committed to the view that words do not have their normal meanings in works of fiction. (Searle 1979a, 64) In order to argue against Searle's thesis I want to begin with a brief look at an extract from a famous fictional story:
The wind shook some blossoms from the trees, and the heavy lilac-blooms, with their clustering stars, moved to and fro in the languid air. A grasshopper began to chirrup by the wall, and like a blue thread a long thin dragon-fly floated past on its brown gauze wings. Lord Henry felt as if he could hear Basil Hallward's heart beating, and wondered what was coming. (Wilde 2007, 9) These sentences clearly could all be used for claiming, reporting and so on. They could all obviously also be part of a non-fictional text. It is a well-known feature of fictional stories that there is no property of the text that defines it as a fictional one.
2 Of course there are some ways to tell a story which are typical for fictional stories and we maybe would be surprised to find such elements in a non-fictional text. Think of formulations like »once upon a time« or special focalizations of a narration (see Köppe 2008; Zipfel 2001 ). In the quoted passage it is the information about Lord Henry's feelings and thoughts that indicate that the quoted passage is part of a fictional text. Nevertheless these features can occur in nonfictional texts as well. Still, even if there is no single feature that allows readers to identify a text as a fictional one, we usually have no problem deciding whether a text is fictional or not. Searle's observation that there is no special kind of sentences in fictional texts seems to me to be perfectly right. However, this observation cannot be used as an argument for his thesis that authors don't perform illocutionary acts by means of fictional utterances. In the following I will argue against this account and I will adduce some reasons why fictional utterances are performances of illocutionary acts. Creationists in particular should not claim that fictional utterances are mere utterance acts, because that would make it even harder to explain how such an act could create anything.
Firstly, it is no special feature of fictional utterances that the sentences in question can be uttered to perform a different illocutionary act. In general it is not the meaning of the words used in an utterance that determines the illocutionary act that is performed by means of this utterance. A sentence of one type can occur in different situations and can be used by different speakers to pursue different goals. One can, for example, use the sentence »This is a very dangerous dog.« just to inform someone, but it can also be used to warn a person. This does of course not mean that there are no connections between the meaning of the words used and the illocutionary act performed. But if we want to find out which illocutionary act was performed by uttering some words, we need more information about the context of the utterance. This context usually contains information about the speaker and her recipient. 3 Secondly, illocutionary acts can only be performed successfully if the illocutionary act type in question is collectively recognized in the context of the utterance. This means that a speaker cannot perform, for instance, the act of betting if none of her interlocutors knows what a bet is or how you bet. Even if the interlocutors know the meaning of the words used in an utterance, the illocutionary act cannot be performed successfully if they do not know that this utterance can be used to perform an act of a special kind such as betting.
If we have the institution of a certain illocutionary act type, it is -in generalpossible that an utterance can count as a performance of this type. That shows that linguistic utterances can also have the underlying structure of the form »X (the meaningful sentence) counts as Y (the performance of a certain illocutionary act) in context C«.
The institution of a certain illocutionary act type has the same function as the standing declaration I mentioned in the case of the creation of corporations. We can find a similar structure: in the case of the creation of the corporation, there has to be a standing declaration (usually a law) that allows someone to create corporations by making a second declaration. In the case of the performance of illocutionary acts, we need a standing declaration that allows someone to perform illocutionary acts of a certain type by making utterances. If there is a collectively recognized institution for a certain illocutionary act type, an utterance can count as the performance of this illocutionary act type. In contrast to the case of the corporation, there is no second declaration involved. There is one exception: the illocutionary act type of declaration itself. To perform a declaration successfully, by means of an utterance the institution of declaration must also be collectively recognized. Thus, every successful performance of a declaration has this two-step structure Searle mentioned in the case of the creation of corporations.
Thirdly, there are many ways to fail when trying to perform an illocutionary act (Austin 1962) . There are specific difficulties with the different illocutionary act types. However, most of them have in common that vagueness can be a reason for failure. Therefore, in order that the performance of an illocutionary act is successful, it is important that the speaker tries to enable recipients to recognize which illocutionary act she wants to perform by means of her utterance.
It is important to see that these points about illocutionary acts in general are valid for fictional utterances as well: 1. If an author wants to tell a fictional story, there must be a collectively recognized institution of fictional story telling. If one were to try to tell a fictional story in a context where no one is familiar with the institution of telling fictional stories, the recipients would misunderstand the utterances. The recipients could, for example, interpret the utterances as assertive illocutionary acts. In this case they could (1) believe what the author said, (2) not believe what the author said and think that she was mistaken, or (3) not believe what the author said and think that she was lying. Only if it is a known fact that we can use assertive sentences 4 to tell a fictional story and if it is roughly known what it means to tell a story fictionally, can recipients interpret utterances as fictional ones. Thus, there must be the collectively recognized institution of fictional story telling in order that an individual speaker can tell a fictional story successfully. 2. Vagueness is also a problem for fictional utterances. As I mentioned above, there is no feature of fictional utterances that would allow recipients to identify an utterance as a fictional one. But still authors can use rhetorical devices or the explicitly name the genre in order to make it recognizable that they are telling a fictional story.
Thus, in order to tell a fictional story as a fictional one successfully (1) there must be a collectively recognized institution of fictional story telling, a kind of standing declaration, and (2) the author must make it possible for the recipients to recognize that it is a fictional story she is telling.
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Thus, we can in the case of a fictional utterance find the same structure as that discovered in situations in which other illocutionary acts are performed. I think this is sufficient to justify the claim that fictional utterances are performances of illocutionary acts. I have also shown that collective recognition plays a role in the explanation of fictional story telling: in order for someone to tell a 4 With »assertive sentence« I just mean sentences with a certain grammatical structure. Sometimes these sentences are called »declarative sentences«. I don't want to use this expression to avoid any confusion that may be caused by Searle's term »declaration« for a type of illocutionary acts. 5 It is important to notice that of course an author can have a certain success with a story even if no one recognizes that it is a fictional one. The success of the story as a piece of literature does not only depend on the success of the performance of an illocutionary act.
Just My Imagination? -Creation for Creationists fictional story successfully, the institution of fictional story telling has to be collectively recognized in the context of the utterance.
Another reason why notably creationists should take fictional utterances to be illocutionary acts is that -according to the creationists -the author creates entities with these utterances. Often philosophers, also Thomasson, argue for this account and simultaneously claim that fictional utterances are pretended assertions. Accounts of this sort tend to be unsatisfactory as that they give only a negative description of these utterances. But a mere negative description cannot explain why these utterances have the power to create entities. Thus creationists need a more substantial theory of fictional utterances. As a consequence, creationists either have to abandon the idea that fictional utterances are pretended assertions or else they should explain what illocutionary act really is performed by means of a pretended assertion. However, Thomasson claims that some fictional utterances are acts of naming a fictional character. She illustrates this claim by means of a quote from George Eliot's Silas Marner:
Often the use of a name in conjunction with words describing the character being written itself constitutes an »official« baptism of the character. For example, in the opening pages of George Eliot's Silas Marner we read: »In the early years of this century, such a linen-weaver named Silas Marner worked at his vocation in a stone cottage that stood among the nutty hedgerows near the village of Raveloe, and not far from the edge of a deserted stone pit.« When the name »Silas Marner« is here employed it is as if it were to say, for example, »the character founded on these very words is to be called ›Silas Marner‹«, so that the very use of the name in the text constitutes a naming ceremony, or at least an official and public report thereof. (Thomasson 1999, 47-48) As she claims that authors perform acts of naming with some fictional utterances, Thomasson cannot be working with the pretence theory Searle developed. Once again, according to Searle's theory fictional utterances are mere utterance acts and cannot be described as the performance of an illocutionary act. But naming is an illocutionary act. Therefore Thomasson could assume that fictional utterances can be described in terms of pretended assertions as a description but that must not exclude a description in terms of an illocutionary act.
The quote above shows once more that Thomasson assumes that authors can create fictional characters merely by mentioning them within the framework of the fictional text (»the character founded on these very words«). If we allow, as I think we should, that an utterance can be correctly classified in various ways, then take from Thomasson two interesting descriptions of what George Eliot did when she wrote the cited sentences: (1) she pretended to assert and (2) she named a character. Somehow these correct descriptions are supposed to be related to the third, according to which she also created a character. But still we have no explanation why or how these utterances can create anything. Acts of naming cannot create new entities. And as I mentioned above, to describe fictional utterances as pretended assertions does not offer an answer to the question of how a fictional character is created. How, then, might creationists answer this question?
Once again it will be of help to turn to Searle's speech act theory and his theory of social reality. According to Searle, there is exactly one illocutionary act type that has the power to create new entities: declarations. If Searle on the one hand and the creationists on the other hand are right then fictional utterances are a kind of declaration. Thus we have the same two-step structure as Searle described in the case of the creation of a corporation: there is a standing declaration (the institution of fictional story telling) that allows authors to perform a second declaration (fictional utterances) to create fictional characters.
Yagisawa's question I mentioned at the beginning was: How can someone create something by making so many false claims? Now we can see that authors by means of fictional utterances neither make nor pretend to make false claims. Obviously, this account raises a large number of further questions. I have emphasised the similarities between social and fictional entities, but of course there are big differences. A detailed analysis of fictional utterances has to pay attention to these as well.
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If creationists accept my claims about fictional utterances, we have to ask whether they can still assume consistently that a fictional character is created by a fictional utterance that is not read or heard by any recipient. I think creationists should reject this assumption. Instead they should claim that a fictional character can only be created by means of a successful fictional utterance. But an utterance is not successful as an illocutionary act until at least one recipient has heard or read it and understood it as a fictional one. Illocutionary acts are first of all communicative acts and it is obvious that the success of a communicative act depends not only on what the author or speaker does but also on the recipient.
5 The recipient's role in the process of the creation of the fictional character
In the following I shall argue that on a Searlean theory of illocutionary acts, the successful performance of an illocutionary act generally requires that there be a recipient/hearer who understands the utterance. There may be marginal cases in which one person counts as both speaker and hearer, e. g. cases of schizophrenia. However, ordinary soliloquies are no performances of illocutionary acts in the full sense. This is not the place to argue for that position in detail. But I want to show briefly for the case of assertions why according to Searle's theory illocutionary acts are not successfully preformed in privacy. I argue firstly that only utterance tokens which in the specific situation are necessary to realize the illocutionary point or purpose can count as performances of illocutionary acts. Secondly, in order to perform an illocutionary act successfully, the utterance must bring about an illocutionary uptake in the recipient/hearer, i. e. she must understand the utterance.
It is important to see that, according to Searle's speech act theory, »the speech act is more than just the expression of an intention or the expression of a belief. It is above all a public performance« (Searle 2010, 83) . For Searle the »point or purpose of the members of the assertive class is to commit the speaker (in varying degrees) to something's being the case, to the truth of the expressed proposition« (Searle 1979b, 12) . The claim that a commitment -to the truth of the expressed proposition -is the central point of assertions means that asserting is an act that is essentially social. In order to argue for the first claim, I want to begin by taking a brief look at cases in which the speaker and the hearer are not the same person: What is the role the utterance act plays in this case? If someone wants to address something to another person, it is obviously necessary that she utters something, whether orally, in writing or by gestures. And in the case of assertion, it is obvious that the commitment can only be brought about if the speaker performs an utterance act. If nothing is uttered, a hearer would have no reason to ask for evidence and so on. Thus, if the point or purpose of an assertion is to commit the speaker to something's being the case, in cases in which the assertion is addressed to another person, the utterance act is necessary.
But what if the utterance is not addressed to another person? Let's assume that the speaker just wants to talk to herself in a meaningful way. In such a case, she doesn't simply want to produce noises and she isn't, for example, just practicing phonetic aspects of a foreign language. Here, I can't see that (if there is a commitment at all) it is necessary to utter anything in order to bring the commitment about. Of course, it is possible to express a belief or an intention if no one else is around. But let me again emphasize that this is not what I want to call an assertion. An utterance can only count as a successful performance of an illocutionary act if the illocutionary point or purpose of that very act is served. To this end the speaker must by uttering something bring about an illocutionary uptake.
What does that mean for the role of the utterance act in detail? An agent may have reasons to utter something to herself in order to bring about certain effects, such as calming or comforting herself. But those effects are perlocutionary and not an illocutionary uptake. According to Austin, an illocutionary uptake 7 is the understanding of the utterance as an illocutionary act of a certain kind:
Unless a certain effect is achieved, the illocutionary act will not have been happily, successfully performed. This is not to say that the illocutionary act is the achieving of a certain effect. I cannot be said to have warned an audience unless it hears what I say and takes what I say in a certain sense. An effect must be achieved on the audience if the illocutionary act is to be carried out. How should we best put it here? And how can we limit it? Generally the effect amounts to bringing about the understanding of the meaning and of the force of the locution. So the performance of an illocutionary act involves the securing of uptake. (Austin 1962, 177) It would be odd to claim that a person who intentionally tries to assert something understands that the utterance is an assertion as a result of that utterance. Moreover, it would be equally odd to claim that she has committed herself to having evidence for the truth of the uttered proposition as soon as she utters this proposition, but was not so committed before she uttered it. Certainly, one might say that an agent ought to revise a belief if she has evidence that the belief is false. But, firstly, »commitments« involved in attitudinizing are weaker than commitments that go along with speech acts. Secondly, I don't think that in cases of soliloquies we add commitments by uttering something. Again, the act of utterance may be required in order to cause perlocutionary effects. But it seems obvious that a speaker cannot bring about her own illocutionary uptake, i. e. an understanding of the type of speech act performed, by performing that speech act. In these kinds of cases, then, the act of utterance may be necessary to perform a perlocutionary act, but it cannot involve an illocutionary act, as it can neither fulfill the illocutionary point or purpose nor bring about an illocutionary uptake. A speaker who merely utters a sentence to herself has not committed herself to anything being the case in a stronger sense than by just having the corresponding belief or by mentally tokening a soliloquy. My second claim was that in order to perform an illocutionary act successfully the utterance must bring about an illocutionary uptake in the recipient/hearer, 7 Also according to Searle, a certain effect has to be achieved in order to perform an illocutionary act successfully: »In the case of illocutionary acts, we succeed in doing what we are trying to do by getting our audience to recognise what we are trying to do. But the ›effect‹ on the hearer is not a belief or a response, it consists simply in the hearer understanding the speaker. It is this effect that I have been calling the illocutionary effect.« (Searle 1969, 47 ) I decided to use Austin's term »uptake« because »effect« is maybe misleading as one could think of perlocutionary effects.
i. e. that the recipient/hearer must understand the utterance as being of the relevant speech act type. In Searle's words:
Human communication has some extraordinary properties, not shared by most other kinds of human behaviour. One of the most extraordinary is this: If I am tying to tell someone this, then (assuming certain conditions are satisfied) as soon as he recognises that I am trying to tell him something and exactly what I am trying to tell him, I have succeeded in telling it to him. Furthermore, unless he recognises that I am trying to tell him something and exactly what it is that I am trying to tell him, I do not fully succeed in telling it to him. (Searle 1969, 47) As long as there is no illocutionary uptake on the recipient/hearer, according to Searle, the illocutionary act was not performed successfully. It seems to follow that the point or purpose of the illocutionary act in question can then not have been fulfilled. That means for an assertion that no commitment is brought about as long as no one has heard or read the utterance and understood it.
But do we really want to claim that the speaker is not committed to the truth as long as no one has understood the assertion? And does a recipient/hearer not have the right to ask for evidence when she has not yet understood the assertion? I think we have to understand commitments and rights as essentially social entities. That means that one can, strictly speaking, only be committed to doing something or have a right to do something if there is someone who can confer or accept or recognize the right or commitment. If this is correct, the existence of commitments and rights depends on at least two persons being involved, one who is committed or has the right and another who confers or recognizes the relevant deontic property. With regard to the commitments of an assertion that means, first, that a speaker's commitment to something being the case begins the moment a recipient has understood the utterance and, second, that the recipient's right to ask for evidence begins once she has understood the utterance, but not before.
I started by asking whether it is possible for an author to create a fictional character just by telling a fictional story without any recipient. Now we can answer this question: understanding fictional utterances as illocutionary acts means that the success of a fictional utterance depends on there being a recipient. I argued further that an author can only create fictional characters by successfully performing fictional utterances. It follows from the dependence of successful fictional utterances on a recipient, together with the transitivity of dependence, that the existence of the fictional character also depends on there being a recipient. Like commitments fictional characters are, according to this proposal, social entities. Their existence depends not only on what an author does but also on a recipient. It follows, then, that a fictional character starts to exist when, but not before a fictional utterance has brought about an illocutionary uptake. If this is right, then it is obvious that acts of imagining cannot replace fictional utterances in the process of the creation of fictional entities.
Note that even if creationist stick to the thesis that a fictional character comes into existence independently of a recipient, it is still reasonable to make a difference between an utterance and mental acts of imagining. Creationists could claim that for the creation of a fictional character it is sufficient that an utterance could in principle be understood as a fictional one. Then it would be sufficient that an utterance could be understood by a reader if there was one. Just to say it again: This could be the case when an author writes a fictional story in a way that it would be possible for a (possible) reader to recognize the story as a fictional one because (1) the author lives in a context where the institution of fictional story telling is collectively recognized and (2) the author gives signs like special rhetorical devices that make it possible to understand the story as a fictional one.
But even if a recipient is not necessarily involved in the process of the creation of fictional entities, fictional utterances have properties that they do not have in common with acts of imagining. (1) There is no need for a collectively recognised institution in order for someone to perform a mental act of imagining successfully. (2) As the mental act is private, obviously the person who imagines something does not have to do anything to let other people recognise what she is doing. Acts of imagining are -at least in the situation described above -not part of a social practice.
I don't want to deny that imagination and fiction are in some sense connected. But by understanding fictional utterances as performances of illocutionary acts I have emphasised the social character of fiction. In this paper I was only concerned with purely linguistic fictional utterances. But I think that it is also possible to demonstrate the social character of fiction in those cases in which language is not exclusively or not primarily involved e. g. in films or plays.
Taking central theses of the creationist's account for granted, I have argued that fictional characters cannot be identified with mental states of an author. I have advanced an alternative view that telling a fictional story depends on the institution of fictional story telling and is therefore a social practice. Creationists should count fictional characters as products of actions that are part of such a social practice. Thus, acts of imagining cannot produce fictional characters, at least not within a creationistic framework. This does not mean that imagination does not play any role in producing or reading fiction. But creationists need more than imagination to explain how fictional characters are created.
I have certainly not entirely explained how authors can create entities by means of fictional utterances. But I think in (1) naming necessary conditions for successfully telling a fictional story, (2) describing it as a social praxis and (3) explaining the role collective intentionality plays in this practice, we have taken a step forward towards an explanation of the creation of fictional characters and thus to rendering the creationist's account more plausible.
